'166. The Contract provided as follows concerning payment:

3. Payment Terms: by an irrevocable confirmed letter of credit opened from a first class … bank [in country X] and payable 100% at sight. L/C should be directly confirmed & paid at the counters of seller's nominated bank.

167. The Contract provided as follows concerning the deadline for the Respondent to open the letter of credit:

14. Deadline for L/C opening

The documentary credit will be at seller's disposal fully operative and in full-compliance with the contract terms latest by the 13th July 2012.

If the L/C is not opened within the date indicated above the seller has the right to:

a) either extending the shipment period by one day for each day of delay in providing seller with a fully operative documentary credit without paying any late shipment penalty.

b) or declaring the buyer in default and thus cancelling this sale contract.

168. The last date of shipment was stipulated at Clause 9 of the Contract as 15 September 2012.

7.1.3. The Respondent's dealings with … banks concerning the letter of credit

169. … the Respondent asserts that it approached a bank to request the opening of a letter of credit. The Respondent refers there to Exhibit RX 1

170. … Exhibit RX 1 is a request to open a letter of credit … The date accompanying the signature of this document appears to be 5 July 2012.

171. The Claimant does not contest that the Respondent made such a request to open a letter of credit.

172. I find that the Respondent did in fact request a letter of credit from [Bank 1] on 5 July 2012 in order to make payment under the Contract.

173. … the Respondent alleges that that bank refused to open the letter of credit.

174. Both Parties are clear that there never was a letter of credit.

175. I find that [Bank 1] refused to open the letter of credit.

176. … the Respondent alleges that the Respondent "filed a second request for opening a letter of credit from another bank" and refers to Exhibit RX 2.

177. … Exhibit RX 2 is a request to open a letter of credit …

178. The Claimant does not contest that the Respondent attempted to open a letter of credit with this second bank …

179. I therefore find that the Respondent attempted to open a letter of credit with [Bank 2] on 16 July 2012 for the purchase of the Contract goods.

180. … the Respondent alleges as follows regarding the fate of this second application for a letter of credit:

The second request for opening a letter of credit had the same fate as did the first, following the new guidelines of [country X's] Central Bank regarding the currency and the serious economic situation of the state …

………

182. [In its defence statement], moreover, the Respondent alleges:

The refusal by the bank to issue a letter of credit is related to the economic requirements in [country X], which resulted several measures in order to control and restrict the output of the currency.

183. Both Parties are clear that there never was a letter of credit.

184. I find that [Bank 2] refused to open the letter of credit.

185. … the Respondent alleges that the Respondent "made many attempts with different banks to have this letter of credit […]".

186. The Claimant does not contest that the Respondent made further attempts to obtain a letter of credit for the Contract goods.

187. I find that the Respondent did approach other banks in an attempt to obtain a letter of credit. I also find that these banks refused the Respondent a letter of credit.

7.1.4. Reason(s) why the Respondent was refused a letter of credit

7.1.4.1. Burden of proof

188. In international arbitration it is generally accepted that a party must prove the allegations it is making. Moreover, it is for the Respondent to prove the facts which would excuse it from liability under the Contract.

189. It is for the Respondent to prove the reason or reasons why it was refused a letter of credit.

7.1.4.2. Evidence

190. … Exhibit CX 12 is an undated letter from the Respondent to the Claimant purporting to cancel the order under the Contract. It states (in translation):

Your invoice was filed with the bank three weeks ago.

The issuing bank … refused the financing.

We tried to negotiate a request for a documentary credit with other banks in order to maintain this order and to continue this matter with your honourable company but without success on our part.

[Country X's] banks are very severe as regards the exit of currency because of the grave economic situation of our country …

191. [The reply from counsel to Respondent] states as follows at paragraphs 13 and 14:

… [country X]'s financial rating was downgraded … by Moody's, … by Fitch and … by Standard & Poor's.

………

[The situation in country X] did not and has not led to an immediate period of stability as we outline in exhibits RX4 to RX8 the country remains very fluid with many uncertainties which could not have reasonably been foreseen by respondent.

192. Exhibits CX 4, and RX 4 to RX 8 all testify to the economic upheaval that [country X] has been experiencing …

193. The only exhibit which speaks about currency restrictions is Exhibit RX 7 [an article from a website]. But, as noted there, that article states that [country X's] government is restricting credit to consumers for consumer purchases. That article says nothing about non-consumer credit. The Contract is not for the purchase of consumer goods but is for the purchase of industrial goods, by a business, for business purposes.

194. I also note that in an email of 29 June 2012 (Exhibit CX 5, page 2) the Respondent declared to the Claimant (in translation): "The letter of credit will be functional in two weeks. The issuing bank will be [bank]." …

195. At section 3.2.4 of the Statement of Claim the Claimant submits that "[a]ny arguments from the Respondent in connection with the alleged impossibility to open a letter of credit because of the [situation in country X] must be disregarded […]".

196. The term "argument" in the context of legal statements of case ordinarily contemplates legal arguments, and not assertions as to fact.

197. The Claimant has not disputed that the reason or a reason why the Claimant was not able to obtain a letter of credit was because the economic situation facing the country caused banks to tighten their financing conditions.

7.1.4.3. Conclusion as to the reasons for the refusal of the letter of credit

198. I find that the Respondent's statement in Exhibit CX 12 quoted in paragraph 7.1.4.2 above accurately states that the reason why the Respondent was refused a letter of credit is because it had to finance the purchase of the Contract goods, and conditions of financing were restrictive because of the economic upheaval in [country X] prior to and at the time the Respondent was seeking the letter of credit.

7.1.4.4. Was there any deterioration in [country X's] economy between the time the Contract was entered into and the time the letter of credit was sought?

199. … there is a dispute between the Parties as to when the Contract was entered into. The Respondent asserts that this was 2 July 2012 and the Claimant asserts that it was 29 June 2012.

200. As seen in paragraph 170 above, the Respondent's first attempt to obtain a letter of credit was on 5 July 2012.

201. As seen in paragraph 179 above, the Respondent's second attempt to obtain a letter of credit was on 16 July 2012.

202. As seen in paragraph 187, the Respondent subsequently approached other banks for a letter of credit.

203. There is no date that can be ascribed to any of these further attempts. But as noted in paragraph 190 above, the letter states that, "Your invoice was filed with the bank three weeks ago". Counting three weeks from 5 July 2012 when the Respondent first approached the first bank, one arrives at a date of 26 July 2012 as the date of that letter reporting on the discontinuance of the Respondent's efforts to obtain a letter of credit.

204. Moreover, Exhibit CX 15, a letter from the Claimant to the Respondent of 14 September 2012, refers to a letter of 27 July 2012 from the Respondent of the same content as that at Exhibit CX 12.

205. Moreover, at paragraph 8 of the Claimant's … witness statement he testifies: "[o]n July 27th, we received a letter signed by [Respondent's representative] informing us that [the Respondent] would not fulfil its obligations under the sale contract".

206. I therefore find that the Respondent's letter at Exhibit C 12 was dated and received on 27 July 2012.

207. Nonetheless, the Respondent's attempts must have been prior to the Respondent's letter at Exhibit CX 12, and therefore prior to 27 July 2012.

208. There is a question therefore, whether the state of [country X's] economy changed between 29 June 2012 or 2 July 2012, on the one hand, that is, on the candidate dates for the Parties' entry into the Contract, and, on the other, 27 July 2012, being the last date on which the Respondent sought the letter of credit, such that the conditions facing the Respondent in obtaining a letter of credit were thereby negatively affected.

209. All of this evidence on the state of [country X's] economy (see paragraph 192 above) relates without greater precision to an unspecified period of months and even years …

210. … Exhibit RX 4 is dated 23 March 2012, that is a date prior to the period of interest here, and therefore of no assistance. Exhibits RX 5 to RX 8 bear no date. …

211. I therefore find that there is no evidence that there was any exacerbation of [country X's] economy between 29 June 2012 and 27 July 2012 which may have affected the Respondent's prospects of obtaining a letter of credit. I therefore find that the Respondent's failure to obtain a letter of credit was in no way a result of any exacerbation in [country X's] economy.

………

7.4.3. Was the obtaining of a letter of credit a resolutive condition of the Contract?

7.4.3.1. The Respondent's submissions

294. At the oral hearing, for the first time, for the Respondent [counsel] submitted that the Claimant was not authorised to incur any legal obligation until such time as the Respondent had obtained the letter of credit.

295. At section IV, E., page 14 of the Claimant's Post-Hearing Submissions the Claimant treats this argument of the Respondent as an argument that the obtaining of a letter of credit was a resolutive condition of the validity of the Contract.

296. I agree that this characterization is the appropriate way of understanding the Respondent's argument.

297. The Contract is on a form that is by and large standard for the sale of goods to be shipped.

298. The obtaining of a letter of credit is on such form an obligation of the buyer, and the buyer's failure to obtain a letter of credit in accordance with the contract is a contractual breach.

299. In terms of the CISG, such a failure of the buyer to open the letter of credit is a failure "[to] pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them as required by the contract and this Convention" (Article 53 of the CISG).

300. Accordingly, the opening of a letter of credit in accordance with Article 14 of the Contract was an obligation of the Respondent and not a resolutive condition of the Contract.

7.4.4. Did the Respondent breach the Contract without excuse?

7.4.4.1. General

301. By virtue of Article 14 of the Contract, the Respondent was obligated to open a letter of credit by 13 July 2012.

302. The Respondent failed to do so.

303. What are the consequences of this failure?

7.4.4.2. The Respondent's submissions

304. The Respondent makes four arguments concerning the failure to open a letter of credit.

305. First, at section 1 of [counsel]'s Defence the Respondent argues that there was no breach of contract by the Respondent. At paragraph 2 of [counsel]'s Defence and again at paragraph 5 of [counsel]'s Reply, the Respondent submits that the obligation to provide a letter of credit was an obligation of means since its implementation depends on a third party, the issuing bank.

306. Secondly, at page 2 of the Respondent's Post-Hearing Submissions the Respondent contends that the Claimant is precluded from relying on the Respondent's breach because the Claimant failed to make an election of its remedy as required under Article 14 of the Contract. On page 2 of the Respondent's Post-Hearing Submissions the Respondent states: "The seller has not taken neither one nor the other solutions and did not even meet reasonable deadlines to minimize losses."

307. Thirdly, at section C of [counsel]'s Defence the Respondent argues that the Claimant acted in bad faith in not agreeing to extend the deadline for the letter of credit.

308. Fourthly, at section 2 of [counsel]'s Defence, section E.2. of [another counsel]'s Defence, and section 2 of [the latter counsel]'s Reply the Respondent argues that the Respondent was excused from performance under Article 20 of the Contract and by Article 79 of the CISG.

7.4.4.3. The Claimant's submissions

309. The Claimant argues at section 3.3.1 of the Statement of Claim that under Article 54 of the CISG the buyer is obliged to take such steps and to comply with such formal requirements as may be appropriate and necessary actually to perform and guaranty the payment of the purchase price, and that the Respondent failed to do so in failing to provide a letter of credit by the agreed date.

310. The Claimant argues at section 3.3.3 of the Statement of Claim that the Respondent is not excused from performance under Article 20 of the Contract and Article 79 of the CISG since the problems in [country X's] economy were foreseeable at the time of contracting and the Respondent failed to send the Claimant a force majeure notice as required under Article 20 of the Contract.

311. During the oral hearing, and at section IV, D. of the Claimant's Post-Hearing Submissions, the Claimant argues that the definition of force majeure in Article 20 of the Contract only applies to force majeure to which the Claimant was subjected. It argues that Article 14 of the Contract contains clear wording to this effect and any ambiguity (i.e. the reference in Article 14 to "affected party", which might be thought to contemplate the buyer (the Respondent) and the seller (the Claimant) equally) does not disturb its reading. During the oral hearing [counsel] submitted for the Claimant that the broad definition of a force majeure event in Article 20 of the Contract only applies to the Claimant's force majeure since it as seller has much fuller obligations than does the Respondent as buyer. Also in section IV, D. of the Claimant's Post-Hearing Submissions, it argues, if I find that Article 20 of the Contract applies to both Parties, the Respondent is at all events precluded from relying on a force majeure event since it failed to meet its obligations under Article 20 to inform the Claimant immediately of the force majeure event.

7.4.4.4. Determination of whether the Respondent breached its obligation to provide the letter of credit without excuse

<italic>7.4.4.4.1. Obligation of means or of result</italic>

312. Article 14 of the Contract reads as follows in relevant part:

14. Deadline for L/C opening

The documentary credit will be at seller's disposal fully operative and in full compliance with the Contract terms latest by the 13th of July 2012.

[…]

313. I do not agree that the requirement in Article 14 of the Contract is an obligation of means.

314. There is nothing in the language of Article 14 which would suggest that the obligation is anything other than an obligation on the Respondent to procure the result that the letter of credit is opened by [a specified date].

315. The fact that a party must rely on a third party to fulfil its obligations does not make the obligation an obligation of means. It may only be an indication that the obligation is one of means. But on the present facts, there is no such indication.

316. It is true that to open a letter of credit a buyer relies on a third party, the issuing bank. But the issuing bank will provide the letter of credit if the economic terms which the buyer is able to offer are consistent with market conditions. If any particular bank does not, then another will, again providing the economic terms which the buyer is able to offer are consistent with market conditions.

317. Moreover, the opening of the letter of credit is tantamount to the payment of the purchase price since this is how the Parties agreed that the purchase price would be paid.

318. Article 54 of the CISG makes clear that the buyer's obligation to pay the purchase price includes the satisfaction of the contractually agreed method for doing so:

The buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and complying with such formalities as may be required under the contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to be made.

319. It cannot be the case that a buyer is only under an obligation of means to pay the purchase price on time and in accordance with the contractually-agreed method. Buyers are under an obligation of result to pay the purchase price, and the Respondent was under an obligation of result to open the letter of credit by 13 July 2012.

320. The Respondent's failure to open the letter of credit is a failure to pay the purchase price at the contractually-agreed time.

<italic>7.4.4.4.2. Did the Claimant fail to make an election required under Article 14 of the Contract?</italic>

321. Article 14 of the Contract provides in relevant part:

14. Deadline for L/C opening

[…]

if L/C is not opened within the date indicated above, the seller has the right to

a) either extending the shipment period by one day for each day of delay in providing seller with a fully operative documentary credit without paying any late shipment penalty.

b) or declaring the buyer in default and thus cancelling this sale contract.

322. Article 14 of the Contact obviously provides the Claimant seller with an election upon the Respondent buyer's default in obtaining the timely opening of the letter of credit.

323. Part (b) of the election is the cancellation of the Contract.

324. Part (a) of the election is not as clear. It provides that the Claimant will not be liable to the Respondent for the late shipping of the goods for every day that the letter of credit is late.

325. Part (a) therefore assumes a Claimant's election to maintain the Contract - or else the Claimant would not be shipping the goods.

326. It is necessary to interpret one further element of Article 14 of the Contact. It cannot be said that once the Claimant has elected to maintain the Contract the Claimant must do so indefinitely, and that no duration of lateness in the Respondent's providing the letter of credit can then justify the cancellation of the Contract. Such an interpretation is commercially absurd.

327. Rather, Article 14 must be interpreted as conferring on the Claimant the power to maintain the Contract for a period which the Claimant chooses in advance and communicates to the Respondent, and thereafter, if the letter of credit is not then in place, to cancel the Contract. Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with Article 63(1) of the CISG1 which would apply to create the same legal position if the Contract itself had been silent on the matter.

328. On the facts, the Claimant exercised its election under Article 14(a) of the Contract by extending the date for the opening of the letter of credit from 13 July 2012 to 6 August 2012. See the letter of counsel for the Claimant of 27 July 2012 to the Respondent (which is Exhibit CX 11).

329. Thus if the Respondent had not obtained the letter of credit by 6 August 2012 the Claimant would have been entitled to cancel the Contract, by virtue of Article 14(b) of the Contract.

330. But prior to 6 August 2012, that is on 27 July 2012, the Respondent declared that it would not open the letter of credit at all and at any time. See the Respondent's letter to the Claimant of 27 July 2012 (which is Exhibit CX 12).

331. With the Respondent's declaration it would never open a letter of credit, by Article 63(2) of the CISG2 the Claimant was free to pursue its remedies under the Contract and under the CISG.

332. Under the Contract the Respondent was obligated to pay the purchase price via the letter of credit. By Article 54 of the CISG opening the letter of credit was part and parcel of the Respondent's obligation to pay the purchase price.

333. The Respondent's declaration on 27 July 2012 that it would never open the letter of credit conferred upon the Claimant the right to avoid the Contract.

334. This results from the combined operation of paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 72 of the CISG,3 and the definition of "fundamental breach" in Article 25 of the CISG.4 The Respondent's failure to open the letter of credit deprived the Claimant of substantially all of what the Claimant was entitled to expect under the Contract. Indeed, payment of the goods could only be made in accordance with the Contract by letter of credit and, as is very commonly the position in international sales of goods, a seller relies heavily on the security of payment that a letter of credit procures.

335. By letter of 14 September 2012, Counsel for the Claimant notified the Respondent that the Claimant had resold the Contract goods. This amounted to a declaration that the Claimant had elected to avoid the Contract.

336. Even if the Respondent's declaration of 27 July 2012 had not been an anticipatory fundamental breach, once 6 August 2012 had passed, and no letter of credit had been opened by the Respondent, the Claimant had a right deriving directly from the Contract to avoid the Contract.

<italic>7.4.4.4.3. Was the Claimant in bad faith in refusing to extend the date for the opening of the letter of credit?</italic>

337. The Claimant did in fact extend the date for the opening of the letter of credit from 13 July 2012 to 6 August 2012. See the letter of counsel for the Claimant of 27 July 2012 (which is Exhibit CX 11).

338. At any event, there was no obligation on the Claimant to extend the deadline for the opening of the letter of credit. Rather, as seen in paragraphs 322 et seq., Article 14 gave the Claimant an option either to extend or to cancel the Contract.

339. In my opinion the Claimant was free to make either choice and it could make either consistently with good faith.

7.4.4.4.4. Was the Respondent excused from opening the letter of credit?

340. Article 20 of the Contract sets out the circumstances in which the Parties agreed that each would be excused from performance of their respective obligations under the Contract, and the conditions of such excuse:

20. Force majeure

The Seller shall not be liable to the Buyer or any third party or deemed to be in breach of the contract by reason of any delay in performance, or any failure to perform, any of Seller's obligations in relations to the goods, if the delay or failure is due to any cause beyond the Seller's reasonable control. Causes beyond the Seller's control shall include, but shall not be limited to, acts of God, acts, restrictions, regulations, prohibitions or measures of any kind by any governmental or local authority; war, riots, embargos, stoppages, strikes, lockouts, trade disputes, breakdowns, accident, fire, explosion or in the event of shortages, delays or interruption of work or production in the establishment of Seller or in the establishment of any of the Seller's supplier, subcontractor or carrier or agent in the supply of, or defect in, materials or any other occurrence outside the direct control of the Seller or of any of the Seller's supplier, contractor, carrier or agent, including (any other) non or late performance by any supplier, subcontractor, carrier or agent (as the case may be) preventing or hindering performance of Seller's obligations under the Contract; or the Buyer's failure to give any delivery instructions within a reasonable time before the Contract delivery date or Buyer's delay in calling forward or collecting the goods or Buyer's failure without valid reason to accept delivery of the goods. In case of force majeure, the execution of this Contract shall be suspended for the duration of said circumstances, notwithstanding Seller's right to terminate the contract in case of an impediment beyond either Seller's or Buyer's control and to exercise its rights under the termination clause of this contract. Immediately after the start of the force majeure event, the affected party shall notify the other party in writing of the force majeure event, the date on which the force majeure event started and the effect of the force majeure event on its ability to perform its obligations under this agreement. The affected party shall make all reasonable efforts to mitigate the effects of the force majeure event on the performance of its obligation under this agreement. As soon as possible after the end of the force majeure event, the affected party shall notify the other party that the force majeure event has ended and resume performance of its obligations under this agreement.

341. Article 79 of the CISG provides:

(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.

(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if:

(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and

(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were applied to him.

(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists.

(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt.

(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages under this Convention.

342. Article 6 of the CISG provides that contractual parties may derogate from or vary the effect of any of the provisions of the CISG.

343. The curious thing about Article 20 of the Contract is that its express wording might appear to define force majeure events only as relates to the seller, that is, the Claimant.

344. It is possible that Article 20 of the Contract derogates from and displaces the definition of force majeure event in Article 79 of the CISG only as relates to events excusing the Claimant's performance, and that therefore the stricter requirements of a force majeure event, and in particular the unforeseeability requirement in Article 79 of the CISG, apply to claims of force majeure by the Respondent.

345. But I find that this is not the case, and that rather the definition of a force majeure event in Article 20 of the Contract applies mutatis mutandis to the buyer, that is the Respondent.

346. This is because the latter part of Article 20 of the Contract clearly applies to both the seller and the buyer in speaking of "the affected party" and "the other party", without distinction as to whether a party is seller or buyer. In my view this indicates that entirety of Article 20 of the Contract is to apply without distinction to both the Claimant as seller and the Respondent as buyer.

347. In addition, as necessary, it was the Claimant which supplied the language of the Contract, and this reading is consistent with the interpretation principle contra proferentem.

348. The definition of force majeure in Article 20 of the Contract is a broad and permissive one.

349. All that the Respondent is required to demonstrate is that it failed to open the letter of credit due to an event that was beyond its "reasonable control".

350. I interpret this to mean that the event must have rendered the Respondent's performance objectively impossible, that is impossible to a party of ordinary financial circumstances.

351. Article 20 of the Contract provides a non-exclusive list of causes beyond a party's "control". The potentially relevant listed causes are "restrictions, regulations, prohibitions or measures of any kind by any governmental or local authority; war, riots, embargos, stoppages, strikes, lockouts, trade disputes […]".

352. The Respondent has not identified and has provided no evidence of any governmental measure that might have caused the banks to refuse to issue it a letter of credit. As mentioned in paragraph 193 above, the only measure discernable in the evidence is restrictions on consumer credit and that measure is not relevant to the Respondent and its obligation to open a letter of credit.

353. Moreover an event which excuses the Respondent from performance by virtue of Article 20 of the Contract must necessarily be an event which occurred after the Contract was entered into, which I have found was 2 July 2012 …, although it can be a foreseeable event. A party undertaking an obligation assumes the risk of any conditions pre-existing the entry into of the contract [sic].

354. The Respondent has not identified nor provided any evidence for any event after the Contract was entered into due to which it could not open the letter of credit. In particular, the Respondent has not demonstrated that economic conditions in [country X] got worse between the time the Contract was entered into and the time it was obligated to open the letter of credit.

355. Moreover, the Respondent has not demonstrated that it was objectively impossible for it to open a letter of credit. A bank would clearly have opened a letter of credit if the Respondent had had funds with the bank upon which the bank could draw to pay back the letter of credit since that would eliminate the risk to the bank of non-reimbursement. The Respondent has neither pleaded nor proved that it is a particular sort of buyer which may ordinarily purchase goods upon credit. Rather, the ordinary case would seem to obtain here, namely that the Respondent purchased the Contract goods for its own use. In such case, the ordinary purchaser of such goods can be required to have funds with which to purchase goods.

356. In addition, I find that the notice requirements of Article 20 of the Contract must be fulfilled for a Party to be excused from performance thereunder. These notice requirements protect the other Party from abusive invocation of the powerful and broadly applicable instrument that is Article 20.

357. I find that the Respondent failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Article 20 of the Contract and for this reason too the Respondent is not excused from performance.

358. Lastly, even if there had been a force majeure event and the Respondent had observed the notice requirements in Article 20, the Respondent has not shown how it made reasonable efforts to mitigate the effects of the circumstances which it has invoked, namely the difficult economic conditions in [country X]. It might, for example, have requested more time to open the letter of credit. Rather, it simply cancelled the Contract.

359. In conclusion, the Respondent was not excused from its obligation to open the letter of credit by the extended date of 6 August 2012.'

1
Article 63(1) of the CISG: "The seller may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the buyer of his obligations."

2
Article 63(2) of the CISG: "Unless the seller has received notice from the buyer that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the seller may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the seller is not deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance."

3
For convenience, the whole of Article 72 of the CISG is as follows:"(1) If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the contract avoided.(2) If time allows, the party intending to declare the contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the other party in order to permit him to provide adequate assurance of his performance.(3) The requirements of the preceding paragraph do not apply if the other party has declared that he will not perform his obligations."

4
Article 25 of the CISG: "A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result."